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RECENT DECISIONS
Civil Rights Act and Professionally Developed Ability Tests-
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
With the shift in America from a mercantile to a highly industrialized
society,' the right to use his labor and skill has become a person's most
valuable asset.2 The common law did little to preserve this asset, since
an employer had the absolute right to discharge his employee at will.3
While the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution pro-
vided some relief in federal4 and state5 discriminatory practices, they
offered little hope for those deprived of employment opportunities by
the discriminatory acts of private individuals.6 Nor did federal legis-
lation, such as the National Labor Relations Act,7 the Railway Labor
'Affeldt, Title VII in the Federal Courts-Private or Public Law, 14 VmLt. L. REv.
664 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Affeldt]. It concludes that Tide VII recognizes this
change from a mercantile society based upon real property and contract to an industrial
society based upon intangible property and status. Id. at 665.
2 Affeldt, Group Sanctions and Sections 8(b) (7) and 8(b) (4): An Integrated
Approach to Labor Law, 54 GEo. L.J. 55, 70 (1965):
For the vast majority of men their most valuable property is not their TV set,
their home, or their car, but their job, their profession, their franchise, their
contracts. The right to use their labor and skill has become their most valuable
property right.
See also F. TA-NENBAum, A Pnm.osopHay oF LABOR 9 (1951).
3 Affeldt, supra note 1, at 667. Since employers were considered to be private in-
dividuals, they were free to discriminate against, and generally deal with, workers as
they chose. See American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S.
184, 209 (1921); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161 (1908).
4It is the declared policy of the federal government that equal opportunity be
afforded to all qualified persons for employment in the federal government. This policy
excludes discrimination against any employee in the federal government because of
race, religion, or national origin. See Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-
1963 compilation), superseded by Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965
compilation).
5 The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment makes unlawful a
distinction on grounds of race or color in awarding state employment. See Kerr v.
Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945);
Reynolds v. Board of Public Instruction, 148 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
746 (1945).
The fourteenth amendment places restraint only upon the actions of the state and
does not affect the rights of one citizen as against another. See, e.g., Hodges v.
United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
729 U.S.C. § § 151-68 (1964). The only type of discharge prohibited by the NLRA
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Act," or the Labor Management Relations Act,9 do much to protect
job status. Even the Civil Rights Acts of 1870 and 1871 fell far short
of remedying discriminatory practices by private employers.10
Beginning with New York in 1945, the states took the initiative in
enacting fair employment laws aimed at discrimination in private em-
ployment." Congress thereafter sought to provide a more compre-
is one actuated by anti-union reasons. Since the burden of proof is on the NLRB, little
protection is given to employees because of the difficulty of demonstrating that the
employer's real intent is to discharge because of union reasons. See generally Christensen
and Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of the Unfair Labor Practices: The
Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALE L.J. 1269 (1968); Comment,
Discrimination and the NLRB: The Scope of Board Power under Sections 8(a) (3)
and 9(b) (2), 32 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 124 (1964).
845 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1964). Neither the Railway Labor Act nor the Labor
Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) expressly prohibit employer discrimi-
nation based on race or color. 2 T. EMERSON AND D. HABea, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTs
IN THE UNITED STATES 1440 (2d ed. 1958).
929 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1964). Under the Labor Management Relations Act, it is an
unfair labor practice for an employer to attempt to arouse racial discrimination to
discourage union membership. See Bibb Mfg. Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 338 (1949); Rapid
Roller Co., 33 N.L.R.B. 557 (1941); Planters Mfg. Co, 10 N.L.R.B. 735 (1938). But cf.
Sharney Hosiery Mills, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. No. 102 (1958).
10 These statutes confer equal rights upon all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964) and 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964). However,
these provisions are little used because of the restrictive interpretation placed upon
them by the Supreme Court. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 27 (1883). These
provisions stood the test of constitutionality because of the references to state action
in two statutes which create criminal and civil liability for the deprivation of federal
rights under color of state law. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1964). These latter provisions are not, however, applicable to private individuals.
See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
Nevertheless, a private individual may be subject to criminal and civil liability for
conspiring to deprive or interfere with a citizen's civil rights. See 18 U.S.C. § 241
(1964) and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1964). In the former, however, because only state
and not federal rights are involved, it has been held that one's right to perform a
contract of employment without interference by a private person is not protected. See
Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906). The latter statute has been held to apply
only where the object of the conspiracy is to deprive the victim of equality under
the law. See, e.g., Spampinato v. M. Breger & Co., 270 F.2d 46 (2nd Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 944 (1960).
11 For a discussion of state fair employment laws, see Rosen, The Law and Racial
Discrimination in Employment, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 729, 775 (1965); Note, Legal Implica-
tions of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in Employment and Education, 68
COLUM. L. REv. 691, 720 (1968); Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1138 (1955). For a critical
analysis of state fair employment laws, see Bonfield, An Institutional Analysis of the
Agencies Administering Fair Employment Practices Law, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rrv. 823
(1967); Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice Commissions: A
Critical Analysis with Recommendations 14 Bu"q. L. REv. 22 (1964).
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hensive attack on job discrimination by the enactment of Tide VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.12 To this end an Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) was created 13 to investigate charges of
discrimination in employment and to seek conciliation and abandonment
of the discriminatory practices by negotiation with the enterprise con-
cered.'4 Should this fail, the aggrieved party could seek injunctive re-
lief in the courts."
As with all statutes, the success or failure of Title VII will not de-
pend upon its language, but rather upon the interpretation of that
language by the federal courts.'6 A crucial test arose when the Fourth
Circuit undertook in Griggs v. Duke Po'wer Co.'7 to interpret the
"testing" provision of Section 703 (h) of Title VII. 8 Several Negro
employees brought a class action challenging the validity of the com-
pany's promotion and transfer system'2 which utilized both general
intelligence and mechanical ability tests. ° It was found that six of the
12 42 US.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1964):
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse or hire or to discharge any individual, or to otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
18 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1964).
14 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-5(a) (1964).
15 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (e) (1964).
118 Affeldt supra note 1, at 665.
' 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970).
18 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (h) (1964).
. . . nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give
and act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided
that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed,
intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.
19 Duke's work force is divided into five departments with job classification within
each, constituting lines of progression for advancement purposes, i.e., when a vacancy
occurs, the senior man directly below is promoted if qualified for the job. In 1955
Duke initiated a policy of requiring a high school education or its equivalent for
employment, except in the Labor and Coal Handling Departments, the lowest on the
scale. In 1965 Duke amended its policy to allow promotion from the Labor and Coal
Handling Departments for those employees who could pass the lWonderlic general
intelligence test and the Bennett Mechanical AA general mechanical test with scores
equivalent to those achieved by an average high school graduate.
20Because Negroes had been hired into only the Labor Department prior to the
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Negro employees, those hired prior to the institution of the company's
test requirement, had become isolated in the lowest classed department
by previous discriminatory practices. 21 As to these six, the test require-
ments were deemed discriminatory.22 However, as to those hired after
the advent of the test requirement, the tests were held to be valid.23
The court stressed that the tests served a genuine business purpose24 and
that there was no intent to discriminate,26 thus fulfilling the mandate of
the statute, and that there was no necessity that the tests be job-re-
lated.26
Of all the types of discrimination which the Civil Rights Act pro-
hibits, the most difficult to detect and enforce is discrimination in em-
ployment. It is relatively easy for an employer or labor union under
a guise of neutrality to set up artificial devices within which discrimi-
nation can flourish.28 To remedy this and to prevent a freezing of
Civil Rights Act, the plaintiffs contended that the tests continued the effects of
Duke's past racial discrimination. See generally Cooper and Sobel, Seniority and
Testing under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of
Hiring and Promotion, 82 HAxv. L. Rav. 1598 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Cooper
and Sobel].2 1 The court found, on the other hand, that "many white employees who likewise
did not have a high school education or its equivalent had already been hired into the
better departments and were free to remain there and be promoted into better, higher
paying positions." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1230-31 (4th Cir. 1970).
22Id. at 1231.
23 Id. at 1232.
24 In a dissent by Judge Sobeloff this business purpose was disclaimed due to the
imbalance in the application of the standards. The company claimed that because of
increasing complexity in the business, employees, in the advanced departments were
sometimes unable to advance because of low intelligence levels. Duke claimed to have
adopted its testing requirements to ameliorate this situation and to upgrade its work
force. However, the restriction was only placed on transfer from the two lower
departments. In other words, one without a high school education who was already
in one of the higher departments could transfer into another department without
any restrictions. Id. at 1237.
25 But see Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 60 CCH Lab. Cas. 9297, at 6742
(E.D. Ark. July 8, 1969). The court states, ". . . an employer cannot discharge his
statutory obligation by announcing non-discriminatory policies or by disclaiming
intent to discriminate." Id. at 6744.
26 This position put the Fourth Circuit into conflict with the Fifth Circuit, the latter
declaring that job-relatedness was essential. See Papermakers Local 189 v. United States.
416 F.2d 980, 994 (5th Cir. 1969) (dictum).
27 Affeldt, supra note 1, at 665.
28 See generally Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969):
Dobbins v. Electrical Workers Local 212, 292 F.Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
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Negroes in prior discriminatory patterns,2 9 the courts have held that
the present and continuing effects of past discrimination fall within
the Act's prohibition 0 Such holdings do not alter the prospective
character of the Civil Rights Act,"- because it is not the past discrimi-
nation itself which is attacked but the on-going effects of it.32 Also,
freezing in prior discriminatory patterns has been struck down by the
courts in the areas of education 8 and voting rights 4 and recently in
employment practices, such as seniority systems,35 employee referral
systems, 6 and union membership requirements, 7 where such practices
have perpetuated the effects of past discrimination.
Seeking to prevent the perpetuation of past discrimination in edu-
2 9 See Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968). Judge
Butzner stated, "It is also apparent that Congress did not intend to freeze an entire
generation of Negro employees into discriminatory patterns that existed before the act."
Id. at 516.
30 See Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); Asbestos
Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Hayes
Int'l Corp., 38 U.S.L.W. 2149 (5th Ci. Sept. 19, 1969); United States v. Electrical
Workers Local 38, 59 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 9226, at 6916 (N.D. Ohio March 13, 1969);
United States v. H. K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968); Dobbins v.
Electrical Workers Local 212, 282 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968); Quarles v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (ED. Va. 1968).
SI See, e.g., Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969);
Dobbins v. Electrical Workers Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
32 See, e.g., Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969);
Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v.
H. K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279
F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va 1968).
33See, e.g., Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683 (1963). The Court struck down
a transfer provision which would allow students to continue the segregation in schools
which had previously been prohibited. See Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294
(1955).
3 4 See, e.g., Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965). The Court states, "... the
court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far
as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimi-
nation in the future." Id. at 154.
35 See Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Electrical 'Vorkers Local 38, 59 CCH Lab. Cas. 9226, at 6916 (N.D. Ohio
March 13, 1969); United States v. H. K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (ND. Ala. 1968);
Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (ED. Va. 1968).
36See United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969);
Dobbins v. Electrical Workers Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
37 See United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969);
Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
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cation 88 and cultural opportunities, 9 the EEOC declared that tests used
to determine employment or promotion must be job-related to be
valid.40 A similar position was taken by the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance (OFCC) . While such administrative interpretations are
not binding on the courts,42 it is generally held that an interpretation
given by the agency established to administer a statute is entitled to
great weight in a court's decision.43 The test is one of reasonableness
of the interpretation,44 and where such requirement is met, the con-
3sSee NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON Disoma s, REPORT, at 203-77 (Bantam ed.
1968); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE NEGROES IN THE UNITED STATES: THEm ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL SITUATION 43-45 (1966).
39 See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVnL DISORDERS, REPORT, at 203-77 (Bantam
ed. 1968); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE NEGROES IN THE UNITED STATES: THEIR ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL SITUATION 43-45 (1966). See also Cooper and Sobel, supra note 20, at 1600,
where it points out that any employment decisions affected by these patterns will have
an adverse impact on job opportunities for blacks.40 See EEOC, Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures, CCH EMPL. PRAC.
GUIDE 16,904, at 7319 (Sept. 21, 1966):
The Commission accordingly interprets "professionally developed ability test"
to mean a test which fairly measures the knowledge or skill required by the
particular job or class of jobs which the applicant seeks, or which fairly affords
the employer a chance to measure the applicant's ability to perform a particular
job or class of jobs. The fact that a test was prepared by an individual or
organization claiming expertise in test preparation does not, without more, justify
its use within the meaning of Title VII.41 See 33 Fed. Reg. 14392 (1968) which implements Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R.
339 (1964-1965 compilation). It requies each contractor regularly using tests "to have
available for inspection, within a reasonable time, evidence that the tests are valid for
their intended purposes."42 See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261,
272 (1968); FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965); American Ship
Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291
(1965); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc, 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Great Northern Ry. v.
United States, 315 U.S. 262, 276 (1942).
43 This principle has been applied to a variety of administrative interpretations. See
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 25 (1969) (IRS); Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393
U.S. 268, 276 (1969); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Comm'n,
390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968); FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965);
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Bhd.
of Elec. Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961); FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 90
(1958); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945) (OPA);
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S.
542, 552-53 (1944) (Selective Serv. Bd.); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S.
125 (1939) (ICC); Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315
(1933) (Tariff Comm'n); Kern River Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 147 (1921) (Dep't
of Interior); McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 481 (1921) (Land Dep't); Grand
Trunk W. Ry. v. United States, 252 U.S. 112 (1920) (Postmaster Gen.).44 See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 US.
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struction of the statute will be upheld even though the court might
have reached a different conclusion if the question had first arisen in
a judicial proceeding.45 Several courts have declared that an EEOC
interpretation of the Civil Rights Act is entitled to similar considera-
tion.46
The EEOC has utilized its interpretation in several instances as a
guideline for determining whether a violation of Tide VII has oc-
curred.47 There is a growing trend in the federal courts to adopt the
EEOC's position on job-relatedness. 48
The EEOC's interpretation is reasonable and should have been fol-
lowed by the Fourth Circuit. It is well established by statistical data
261, 272 (1968); Udall v. Tallnan, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Unemployment Comm'n v.
Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946); Fawcus Mach. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378
(1931); Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 580 (1930); Brewster v. Gage,
280 U.S. 327, 336 (1930); McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 481 (1921); Manufacturers
Ry. v. United States, 246 U.S. 457, 481 (1918); Pennsylvania Co. v. United States,
236 U.S. 351 (1915).
45 See Udall v. Talman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Unemployment Comm'n v. Aragon,
329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14
(1945); NLRB v. Nevada Consol. Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105 (1942); Gray v. Powell,
314 U.S. 402, 412 (1941); Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244 (1941); South
Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251 (1940); Swayne v. Hoyt, LTD v.
United States, 300 U.S. 297, 304 (1937).
40 See Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462 (5th Ci. 1969); Philips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cit. 1969); Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d
283, 287 n.18 (5th Cir. 1969); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th
Cir. 1969); Bowaters S. Paper Corp. v. EEOC, 304 F. Supp. 33, 40 (E.D. Tenn. 1969);
Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 284 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Ind. 1968); International
Chem. Workers Union v. Planters Mfg. Co., 259 F. Supp. 365 (ND. Miss. 1966).
4 7 See Decision of EEOC, CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUmE 1 6112, at 4203 (Jan. 29, 1970);
Decision of EEOC, CCH EMPL. PRAc. GuiDE 1 8088, at 6144 (June 30, 1969); Decision
of EEOC, CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUmE 8516, at 6378 (June 18, 1969); Decision of EEOC,
cited in CCH EMPL. PRAc. GumE 1 1209.20, at 613 (Dec. 6, 1966); Decision of EEOC,
cited in CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIM 11209.25, at 613 (Dec. 2, 1966).
4 8 See Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969); Penn v. Stumpf,
62 CCH Cas. 1 9404, at 6587 (N.D. Calif. Feb. 3, 1970); Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay
Transp. Authority, 61 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 9375, at 6995-10 (D. Mass. Dec. 22, 1969);
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 60 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 9297, at 6742 (E.D. Ark.
July 8, 1969); United States v. H. K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968);
Dobbins v. Electrical Workers Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968). The
court in Griggs recognized the last two cases but only distinguished the Dobbins case.
Furthermore, the basis for the distinction was not one which has been considered
controlling in cases dealing with the testing issue. No reference was made to the
other cases which have adopted the EEOC position. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co..
420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970).
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that Negroes do significantly poorer on standardized intelligence and
ability tests,49 due, for the most part, to the patterns of racial discrimi-
nation in education and cultural opportunities existing prior to the
Civil Rights Act.50 These differences should not be utilized as a test
for employment when they are irrelevant to the issue of adequate job
performance.5' This is not to suggest that employers are required to
hire Negro applicants who are incapable of doing the job. 2 If a test
measures qualifications essential for the job, the fact that it tends to
exclude more Negroes than whites does not make it discriminatory.5
The Fourth Circuit's finding that tests are valid if they serve a
genuine business purpose is without precedent, 54 and the court's sole
49 See Cooper and Sobel, supra note 20, at 1598; Kovarsky, Testing and the Civil
Rights Act, 15 How. L.J. 227 (1969); Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized
Ability Tests in Employment and Education, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 691, 701 (1968).
In regards to the Wonderlic and Bennett tests used by Duke Power Co., it has been
found that 58% of whites could pass the tests, as compared with only 6% of the blacks.
See Decision of EEOC, cited in CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE 1209.25, at 613 (Dec. 2, 1966).
50 "The general patterns of racial discrimination, lesser educational and cultural
opportunities for black people, and cultural separatism that have marked our society
for generations have impeded blacks in attaining the background necessary for success
on existing standardized tests." Cooper and Sobel, supra note 20, at 1640. It is generally
true that standardized ability tests measure the accumulation of acquired knowledge
to predict future ability. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 481 (D.D.C. 1967),
aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
51 See generally Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 60 CCH Lab. Cas. 9297, at
6742 (E.D. Ark. July 8, 1969). The court argues, ".... an employer cannot deliberately
set standards which, for whatever cause, Negroes as a class cannot meet if such stan-
dards have no rational relationship to a legitimate business interest of the employer."
Id. at 6744.
52 On the contrary, the Act may even prohibit "discrimination in reverse." The Civil
Rights Act does not confer any preferential rights to be employed or retained in
employment on Negroes. Nor does it impose any obligation on the employer to hire
unqualified or unneeded employees. See Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 60
CCH Lab. Cas. 9297, at 6742, 6744 (E.D. Ark. July 8, 1969).
5 3See, e.g., Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authority, 61 CCH Lab. Cas.
1 9375, at 6995-10, 6995-12 (D. Mass. Dec. 22, 1969), Parham v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 60 CCH Lab. Cas. 11 9297, at 6742 (E.D. Ark. July 8, 1969).
The court cited no authority for this principle, but rather lifted the term "genuine
business needs" from the appellant's brief and formulated their rule. The pertinent por-
tion is as follows:
An employer is, of course, permitted to set educational or test requirements.
that fulfill genuine business needs. For example, an employer may require a fair
typing test of applicants for secretarial positions. It may well be that, because of
long-standing inequality in educational and cultural opportunities available to
Negroes, proportionately fewer Negro applicants than white can pass such a test.
But where business needs can be shown, as it can where typing ability is
necessary for performance as a secretary, the fact that the test tends to exclude
Vol. 5:157
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reason for refusing to follow the EEOC's position was a misinterpreta-
tion of the legislative history behind the "testing" provision of Section
703 (h). 55 The EEOC has not only made a reasonable interpretation
of the statute, 8 but it has also sought to aid employers in validating their
zore Negroes than whites does vot make it discriminatory. Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 420 F.2d at 1232.
The substance of the entire paragraph indicates support of the job-related require-
ment for testing, especially by the use of the example of a typing test. Thus, it is
apparent that the term "business needs" was meant to incorporate this requirment.
However, the emphasis placed by the court indicates that it either overlooked the
qualification or it lifted the term out of context and disregarded the rest.
65The court in Griggs based its interpretations on remarks made by the sponsor of
the amendment which in modified form became the testing provision of Section 703 (h)
and on an interpretative memorandum prepared by Senators Joseph Clark and Clifford
Case.
Senator John Tower introduced his amendment because of concern over an FEPC
case in Illinois which went to the extreme of suggesting that standardized tests on
which whites perform better than Negroes could never be used. See Myatt v. Motorola,
110 CONG. REc. 5662-64 (1964). The original text of the amendment contained language
that specifically indicated an intent by its sponsor that the tests were to be related
to the particular job in order to be valid. See 110 CONG. Rac. 13492 (1964).
The Clark-Case interpretative memorandum appears to fortify the court's conclusion
in Griggs. It was stated:
There is no requirement in Title VII that employers abandon bona fide
qualification tests where, because of differences in background and education,
members of some groups are able to perform better on these tests than members
of other groups. An employer may set his qualifications as high as he likes, he
may test to determine which applicants have these qualifications, and he may
hire, assign, and promote on the basis of test performance. 110 CONG. REc. 7213
(1964).
However, read in the light of the Motorola decision the memorandum can be reasonably
interpreted as saying that nothing prevents employers from requiring that applicants
be fit for the job. In fact, Senator Case expressed the fear that the provision would be
interpreted as the court in Griggs did. See 110 CoNG. REc. 13504 (1964) (Remarks of
Senator Case):
If this amendment were enacted, it could be an absolute bar and would give
an absolute right to an employer to state as a fact that he had given a test to
all applicants, whether it was a good test or not, so long as it was professionally
designed. Discrimination could actually exist under the guise of compliance with
the statute.
Senators Hubert Humphrey and Case opposed the amendment as being redundant.'
Both Senators felt that a Motorola decision was prevented without the amendment,
and accordingly the amendment was defeated. See 110 CONG. REc. 13503-05 (1964).
Later, the provision in its present, modified form was offered with a tightening of
language to remove the fears of misinterpretation. It was passed. See 110 CoNG. Ric.'
13724 (1964). The job-relatedness feature of the original bill was never in dispute, and
the modified version certainly does not embody a compromise on the point. See
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1237, 1239 (4th Cir. 1970) (dissenting opinion).56 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1237 (4th Cir. 1970) (dissenting opinion).
Judge Sobeloff argues that just because a test is authored by a professional test
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employment tests by issuing recommendations 57 based on studies by a
team of highly qualified psychologists. 8 The Fourth Circuit's position
is clearly out of line with the trend of the law on the issue of testing
in employment and promotion.
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designer does not automatically merit the court's blessing. He uses the example that
a professionally developed typing test could not be considered professionally developed
to test teachers. Similarly, a college entrance examination would be grossly wide of
the mark when used in hiring a machine operator. The EEOC's purpose is to end
discrimination. The Fourth Circuit's ruling would allow such examples to become
realities, and discrimination would flourish.57 See EEOC, Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures, CCH EMPL. PRAC.
GumE 16,904, at 7319 (Sept. 21, 1966). The Commission advocates the use of a total
personnel assessment system which places emphasis on careful job analysis to define
skill requirements, special efforts in recruiting minorities, screening and interviewing
related to job requirements, tests selected on the basis of specific job-related criteria,
comparison of test performance versus job performance, retesting, and validation
of tests for minorities.58See Report by Panel of Psychologists, CCH EmIPL. PRac. GUIDE 16,904, at 7319
(Sept. 21, 1966).
